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MORE POWERFUL, LESS RESPONSIBLE, INVARIABLY LEGITIMATE  
 
Albena Azmanova 




This chapter traces the reconfiguration of the legitimacy relationship between states and 
citizens, and the related alteration of the semantics of the social contract since the advent of 
liberal democracies in Europe. This reconfiguration has fostered the recent emergence of a 
fourth modality of capitalism (as an institutionalized social order) after (1) the entrepreneurial 
nineteenth-FHQWXU\FDSLWDOLVPWKHµRUJDQL]HG¶FDSLWDOLVPRIWKHSRVW-WWII welfare state, 
DQGWKHQHROLEHUDOµGLVRUJDQL]HG¶FDSLWDOLVPRIWKHODWHtwentieth century. A key feature of 
the new modality, in terms of the nature of power relations, is a simultaneous increase in the 
VWDWH¶Vadministrative power and a decrease in its authority. However, due to a recasting of the 
legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens, the deficient authority of states 
has not triggered a legitimacy crisis of the socio-economic system. A readjustment of the 
pathological relationship (from the point of view of democratic legitimacy) between public 
authority and citizens would require a stronger responsibilization of public authority in 







From the Crisis of Capitalism to its Metamorphosis 
 
On the alleged crisis of capitalism 
In the midst of the global financial meltdown, pronouncements on the terminal crisis 
of capitalism abound: French President Nikolas Sarkozy¶VUHEXNHRIILQDQFH
capitalism ZLWK0DU[¶VDas Kapital in hand) has chimed with the admonitions 
advanced by the radical sociologist David Harvey.i  Despite the global spread of 
popular protest against capitalism (which originated with the Occupy Wall Street 
movement in September 2011 in New York), WKHV\VWHP¶VOHJLWLPDF\LVKDUGO\LQ
crisis. If democratic elections are any indicator of prevailing preferences in our 
societies, the most recent round of elections in the mature democracies of Europe 
suggest that neoliberal capitalism has considerable popular support, as the democratic 
vote has gone persistently to the economically liberal center-right parties advocating 
the very economic model that caused the economic meltdown of 2008-2011.ii   
 By all evidence, there is no broad, cross-ideological coalition of forces 
mobilizing to protect society from the disembedded market, in the style of the 
counter-movement against free markets that Karl Polanyi had observed to take shape 
in the early twentieth century. At the time, European Conservatism and Socialism 
came to a consensus on the need to constrain markets -- a consensus which enabled 
the construction of the post-war welfare states.  Instead, we now have governments, 
irrespective of their ideological allegiance, running to the rescue of financial capital 
and big business, and implementing austerity programs to reassure capital markets -- 
at the social cost of increased poverty and insecurity -- while society bears this with 
relative equanimity. Social frustration is, instead, being channelled into xenophobia.  
 While we have been busy debating the crisis of capitalism, as I will ascertain 
in what follows, capitalism has metamorphosed itself into a new form, which the most 
recent economic crisis has helped consolidate, but did not trigger. In order to 
understand why our societies are not making an effort to protect themselves, to 
comprehend the social pathology associated with this complacency, as well as to 
discern a perspective of emancipation, we need to understand the nature of this new, 
post-neoliberal capitalism, which I will name aggregative capitalism (because of the 
way it aggregates risks and opportunities among a new set of winners and losers, as I 
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shall explain later on). The novel features concern three dimensions in the structuring 
of the socio-economic order: (a) the organization of the political economy (state-
market relations), (b) the legitimation of political power within the semantics of a new 
social contract between public authority and citizens, and (c) the type of power public 
authority is entitled to exercise. Before I proceed to adumbrate the contours of this 
new modality of democratic capitalism, let me briefly review the three preceding 
formations.  
 
The three sublimated forms of capitalism 
 
Capitalism as a particular socio-economic order has not only been institutionalized in 
a variety of national models that have co-existed synchronically,iii but has also 
undergone a linear, diachronic, transformation -- from its initial, liberal 
(entrepreneurial) modality that was consolidated in the early nineteenth century, to its 
current state. ,GRQRWSURSRVHWRVHHWKHVHGLDFKURQLFPRGDOLWLHVDVGLVWLQFWµHSRFKV¶
but rather, in the style in which both Nicholas Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil discuss 
social change in this volume, these should be seen as overlapping blueprints, 
reconfigurations of a repertoire. 
 7KHµUHSHUWRLUH¶RIFDSLWDOLVPLVFRPSRVHGRILWVRSHUDWLYHORJLF-- the pursuit 
of µforever renewed profit by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise¶ 
(Weber 1992[1930], p.17), together with its ethosiv - a set of worldviews orienting 
behaviour and giving it the meaning of rational enterprise under individual initiative 
(Ibid., p.25). This repertoire emerged as early as the seventeenth century in Europe, 
within varied institutional frameworks  -- from those of monarchical absolutism to the 
free merchant Hansa towns, and consolidated as a distinct socio-economic order in the 
nineteenth century. The process of consolidation, as Polanyi (1957[1944], p.3) 
reminds us, took place within the institutional framework of the liberal state ± itself a 
creation of the self-regulating market. 
 The connection between, on the one hand, economic action and on the other, a 
political-institutional framework ± a connection that engenders the particular 
symbiosis between capitalism as a system of economic interactions and the modern 
liberal state ± rests on a matrix of shared norms shaping the legitimacy relationship 
between public authority and citizens. This relationship is, in turn, articulated in the 
form of what Claus Offe has called µthe legitimate and legitimacy-conferring 
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functions of the state¶v These are functions (e.g. protection of private property, 
defence of territorial integrity, safeguarding order) that citizens expect from public 
authority, and therefore condition their obedience on the effective exercise of such 
functions. It is important to note that what are deemed to be legitimate functions of 
the state are neither simply embodiments of interests, nor of functional needs of the 
system. The functions of public authority are articulated within a symbolic fabric of 
SHUFHSWLRQVZLWKLQZKLFKWKH\DUHVRFLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHGDVEHLQJµOHJLWLPDWHDQG
OHJLWLPDF\FRQIHUULQJ¶  These legitimating perceptions are akin to ideology 
understood as mental representations specific to a given era ± µa set of shared beliefs, 
inscribed in institutions, bound up with actions, and hence anchored in reality¶ 
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2005 [1999], p. 3). The legitimacy relationship between 
public authority and citizens, in turn, determines the thematic scope of the agenda of 
public debate: which social practices get politicized and thus become an object of 
contestation and which ones are accepted as a matter of course and therefore remain 
unchallenged. 
 The first modality of capitalism, the nineteenth century entrepreneurial form, 
developed within a unique political framework ± that of the liberal constitutional state 
committed to ensuring institutional autonomy for the individual. This institutional 
autonomy was the foundation for the freedom of economic enterprise (laissez-faire) 
via the freedom of contract vested in law.vi The emergence of the legal system of the 
modern liberal state cannot be simply attributed to capitalistic interests, although such 
interests, DV:HEHUZULWHVKDYHµundoubtedly also helped, but by no means alone and 
QRUHYHQSULQFLSDOO\¶ (Weber 1992 [1930], p. 25). The form of capitalism that Weber 
deemed to be unique for the modern West -- the rational capitalistic organization of 
(formally) free labour (Ibid., p. 21), is correlated to the institutional set-up of liberal 
constitutionalism via a particular mindset Weber FDOOVµOccidental rationalism¶± µthe 
ability and disposition of men to adopt certain types of practical rational conduct¶ 
(Ibid., p. 26). Worldviews valorizing (and motivating) rational enterprise under 
individual initiative are a key component of this mindset. Thus, economic liberalism, 
in this first modality of capitalism, was not simply a norm governing the realm of 
economic action, but rather it was a spiritual mindset, a Zeitgeist, and as such it 
assumed the status of µthe organizing principle of a society engaged in creating a 
PDUNHWV\VWHP¶3RODQ\L 1957 [1944], p.135). At the dawn of the nineteenth century, 
Wilhelm von Humboldt gave expression to this entrepreneurial Zeitgeist, when, 
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writing against the LQWHUYHQWLRQLVWµSRVLWLYH¶VWDWHKHH[FODLPHGµBut what human 
beings are after, and should be after, LVGLYHUVLW\DQGDFWLYLW\«VXUHO\ZHKXPDQ
beings have not sunk so low that we actually prefer welfare and happiness to 
greatness for ourselves, as individuals.¶vii   
 The separation of economics and politics that is a constitutive feature of the 
liberal state, together with its typical institutional paraphernalia (the separation of 
powers, the legal safeguards against unlawful interference with the rights of privacy 
and property) thus provided the political setting for entrepreneurial capitalism; it 
became µthe irrefragable condition of the existLQJV\VWHPRIVRFLHW\¶3RODQ\L 1957 
[1944], p. 225). In this first modality of Occidental capitalism, the behavior-orienting 
value of individual entrepreneurial action moulds the semantics of collective social 
and political existence.  
 After the Second World War, nineteenth-century entrepreneurial capitalism 
was replaced by a new modality ± what Scott Lash and John Urry (1987) named 
µRUJDQLVHGFDSLWDOLVP¶7KLVVHFRQGHQXQFLDWLRQRIWKHUHSHUWRLUHRIFDSLWDOLVP
developed within the institutional format of the welfare state.   
 The catalyst for the birth of the second modality of capitalism was the broad 
societal movement against the economic dogma of the self-regulating market ± a 
movement that emerged already at the waning of the nineteenth century.  The 
collectivist countermovement, Polanyi (1957 [1944], p.145) notes, was a broad 
societal endeavour, which µwas not due to any preference for socialism or nationalism 
on the part of concerted interests, but exclusively to the broader range of the vital 
social interests affected by the expanding market mechanism¶7KLVFRQVHQVXVZDV
brought about not by the threat the market economy represented to the interests of a 
particular social group, but because the market, disembHGGHGIURPVRFLHW\µbecame a 
threat to the human and natural components of the social fabric¶ (Ibid., p.150)viii. The 
matrix of state-society relations thus came to be built on broadly shared worldviews 
converging on the novel, for the early twentieth century, value of social rights. As 
citizenship came to incorporate the social right to a decent standard of living, the 
normative scope of the legitimacy of modern democracies thus expanded to include 
the concept of social justice (i.e. the equitable distribution of social risk), alongside 
the political and civil liberties and the value of economic entrepreneurship that had 
been political cornerstones of the liberal constitutional state. The legitimate and 
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legitimacy-conferring functions of the state came to include a redistributive one, 
together with its corollary ± the social responsibility of public authority.  
 The social partnership among organised capital, organised labor, and a 
democratic state that marked this new socio-political constellation was 
institutionalized in a variety of models of democratic capitalism. This variation is 
FDSWXUHGDORQJWKHµYDULHWLHVRIFDSLWDOLVP¶DQGµYDULHWLHVRIZHOIDUHUHJLPHV¶
taxonomies, which I will refrain from reviewing here,ix and instead will refer 
JHQHUDOO\WRµRUJDQLVHG¶RUµZHOIDUH¶FDSLWDOLVPDVDQRYHU-arching modality that was 
consolidated in the course of the three post-war decades. Welfare capitalism was 
characterized by an organized and institutionalized political collectivism that existed 
on two levels: within the realm of political economy - as corporatism; and within the 
realm of political competition ± as mass, class-based parties competing along a left-
right axis of ideological orientation and forming the large political families of the Left 
and the Right.  
 Since the late twentieth century, µRUJDQL]HG¶ (welfare) capitalism has been 
subjected to policy pressures for economic liberalization and deregulation, to a great 
extent under the imperative of increased competition within a globally-integrated 
capitalist economy. These transformative dynamics have been broadly described as 
µGLV-organizDWLRQ¶RIFDSLWDOLVP-- a breakdown of the mechanisms that had previously 
ensured, through mediation, a dynamic balance between social power and political 
authority (Offe 1989 [1985], p. 6). This disorganization is often cast in the terms of 
liberalization and deregulation of coordinated market economies for the sake of 
enhancing market efficiency, µa trend in the political economy away from centralized 
authoritative coordination and control towards dispersed competition, individual 
instead of collective action, and spontaneous, market-like aggregation of preferences 
and decisions¶Streeck 2009, p. 149). Eventually, the hierarchical Fordist work 
structure that had emerged in the early twentieth century, and had been predominant 
LQWKHSHULRGRIµRUJDQL]ed capitalism,¶ZDVGLVVROYHGLQWRDQHZIOH[LEOHQHWZRUN-
based form of organization.x  
 The matrix of legitimacy-conferring worldviews in this third enunciation of 
the capiWDOLVWUHSHUWRLUHLVVKDSHGE\WKHµQHZVSLULWRIFDSLWDOLVP¶%ROWDQVNLDQG
Chiapello) ± not so much the entrepreneurial individualism that anchored the first 
modality, but an ethos that celebrates more largely initiative and autonomy, co-opting 
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Already before the current economic crisis, capitalism had begun its transformation 
into a new modality, which I have descULEHGHOVHZKHUHDVµUHRUJDQL]HGFDSLWDOLVP¶ 
(Azmanova 2010), to set it apart from the previous, neoliberal form Offe, Lash and 
Urry had named µdisorganized capitalism¶ Neither Offe nor I see these modalities as 
perfectly articulated, distinct ones: we have in mind tendencies and dominant features. 
µ5HRUJDQL]HGFDSLWDOLVP¶SUHVHUYHGPDQ\RIWKHIHDWXUHVRIWKHQHROLEHUDOIRUPWKDW
SUHFHGHGLWDVµGLVRUJDQL]HGFDSLWDOLVP¶LQLWVWXUQKDGSUHVHUYHGPDQ\RIWKHIHDWXUHV
of the welfare state it dismantled. Most importantly, all these modalities preserve the 
HVVHQWLDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHµUHSHUWRLUHRIFDSLWDOLVP¶± namely its operative logic 
(the unlimited pursuit of profit by means of the rational capitalistic organization of 
formally free labor, and its ethos (of rational enterprise under individual initiative). I 
will now only discuss those transformative dynamics that concern the formation of a 
new matrix of state-society relations as they affect the semantics of state-building. 
 
The redefinition of state-market relations: from economic growth to global 
competitiveness 
 
In the late twentieth century, post-industrial societies have undergone a 
transformation under the influence of two vectors of globalization: open borders and 
information technology that, together, have altered the parameters of the relationship  
between public authority and citizens. The new economy of open borders has not only 
induced the proliferation of risk, as Ulrich Bech (1992) has noted, but it has also 
increasingly generated opportunity, while the distribution of both risk and opportunity 
has become strongly stratified, with the state gradually shifting its role from 
countering social stratification (via compensatory social protection) to fostering it. Let 
me trace the logic of this shift more carefully.  
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twentieth century.  The policy agenda at that time came to be centered not simply on 
enhancing market efficiency in order to enhance growth (as in the formula of 
neoliberal capitalism of the 1980s and 1990s), but on achieving increased 
competitiveness in the global economy. Governments across the political spectrum 
undertook liberalization and deregulation of the economy as part of national strategies 
for international competitiveness.xi  This shift has been explicit in the EU policy 
agenda since the turn of the century, as the stress on global competitiveness has 
become more acute in the transition from the Lisbon Strategy of 2000xii to its revised 
version adopted in 2006, to the current Agenda 2020. The objective of global 
competitiveness has generated a trans-ideological policy consensus, embraced by 
capital and labor, and enforced by public authority both at the level of European 
Union institutions as well as at the level of member-states. Tellingly, even trade-union 
activity has changed its nature, as labour-market liberalization, accepted under the 
threat of losing jobs, became a central object of agreement.xiii Within this new 
corporatism, the value-martix of social rights becomes reinterpreted, under the 
objective of global competitiveness, purely in the sense of access to the labour market 
(keeping a job).  
 
Here add abt commodification of risk  
A distinguishing feature of aggregative capitalism is that the creation of fictitious 
commodities has been extended to investment risk.xiv What we might call the Ǯǯ consists in the packaging of leveraged financial 
products and selling them as profit-creating goods Ȃ a situation in which the risk 
contained in the package is the primary entity generating profit.  The 
commodification of risk is most apparent in the case of credit default swaps 
(CDS)xv. In contrast to standard insurance, which one takes on a property one 
owns (a life, a house) CDS allow one to ensure what one does not own Ȃ namely ǯǤ
(a fictitious commodity that remains deeply rooted in the fabric of social 
relations which endow it with the meaning of profit-generating risk), was the 
primary cause of transforming the final crisis of 2008 into an economic crisis and 
subsequently Ȃ a social one. 
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The state: more powerful, less responsible 
 
In the course of these dynamics, the role of the state has altered. Public authority (at 
all levels of governance) has undertaken ever more policy action to intensify the 
production of wealth, but less and less action to redistribute it.  
 Consequently, the range and nature of the responsibility of public authority 
has changed. At both the state and the EU level, public authority is undertaking ever 
increasing action to enhance market efficiency (for the sake of global 
competitiveness), with dramatic increase in social risk, yet this same public authority 
has ceased to assume responsibility for the generated risk.  Rather than a retrenchment 
of the state, we have the new phenomenon of an increase in the power of governing 
bodies (and their capacity to inflict social harm), while their responsibility for the 
social consequences of policy action is decreasing. This discrepancy between power 
and responsibility is harmful to democracy, as the exercise of power becomes ever 
more autocratic, even if all rituals of democratic politics are diligently performed.   
 The discrepancy between power and responsibility should be eroding the 
authority of states, as Richard Sennett (2008) has claimed, and could be expected to 
trigger a legitimation crisis of the system. Yet, no such crisis ensues. This is the case 
because in the meantime, the legitimacy relationship between citizens and public 
authority has altered in such a way as to absolve the state from social responsibility. I 





During the third, neo-liberal stage, the matrix of state-society relations had been what 
Giandomenico Majone (1990) has described as the µUHJXODWRU\VWDWH¶ ± a state that 
gives priority to the use of legal authority and regulation over other tools of 
stabilization and redistribution. A peculiarity of this style of regulation is that it is 
individual-based. Regulatory policy under what the French call O¶pWDWVRFLDODFWLI was 
conducted in a style of policy-making that consisted in transferring responsibilities for 
wellbeing from public authority to citizens on issues ranging from maintaining a 
healthy lifestyle, to protecting the environment, remaining employable, finding jobs 
DQGVHFXULQJSHQVLRQV7KXVµWKHQDQQ\¶VWDWHRIZHOIDUHFDSLWDOLVPZDVUHSODFHGE\
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µWKHVWHSPRWKHUVWDWH¶RIWKHQHR-liberal 1980s and 1990s ± a state that used legal 
authority to enforce individual self-reliance. 
 The role of the state has been further altered in recent years to allow it to 
actively manage the distribution of opportunities and risks via a new type of 
intervention: intervention aiming to lend support to specific economic actors. We all 
witnessed the massive bailout of failing banks, but also the special support states 
provided to specific companies (especially in the automotive industry) during the 
economic crisis. This aligns with a practice, preceding the crisis, of setting up 
µQDWLRQDOFKDPSLRQV¶ ±  with private companies receiving large financial support from 
the state, in defiance of EU competition rules, on the grounds of being strategically 
important for the competitiveness of national economies.  This redistribution of funds 
from taxpayers to particular businesses or sectors of the economy amounts to saving 
capitalists, rather than salvaging capitalism.  However, it is not only corporate capital 
that has profited from privileged treatment by the state; so have groups of workers. 
Illustrative of this development, for instance, was the manner in which the French 
government attempted to alleviate the social pain of the austerity measures it had 
introduced in early 2011.  Alarmed by stagnating and dropping incomes (and a drop 
in purchasing power), the French government introduced in April 2011 a one-off 
payment of 1000 euros per salaried worker.  However, the beneficiaries of this 
seemingly generous provision were select: only workers in the largest publicly listed 
corporations on the French stock-exchange (the CAC 40). Left out were those 
working in small and medium companies, public sector employers, and those on 
minimum wage (the so called smicards). Thus, the state renewed its redistributive 
function but directed it differently ± not towards those most at risk of impoverishment 
(as in the times of welfare capitalism), but instead towards those in the best position 
to enhance the competitiveness of the national economy in the global market.   
 By force of these newly assumed redistributive functions of public authority, 
which were already developed well before the economic crisis, we have entered into a 
new matrix of state-society relations.  The overly-SURWHFWLYHµQDQQ\VWDWH¶RISRVW-war 
ZHOIDUHFDSLWDOLVPDQGWKHµVWHS-PRWKHUVWDWH¶RIWKHQHROLEHUDOODWHtwentieth century 
(a state which keeps  its distance from society), have been replaced by WKHµrich uQFOH¶ 
state ± one that readily intervenes to help select actors for the sake of competitiveness 
in the global economy.  
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State-managed aggregation of risks and opportunities  
 
In the liberal modality of capitalism the state plays a market-constitutive function; in 
the modality of organized capitalism within the framework of  post-WWII welfare 
capitalism, it plays a remedying function (using regulation and redistribution to 
remedy social risk).  In the third, neoliberal form, the state lets the market assume 
more governing functions. In the fourth modality, it actively intervenes in order to 
enhance the global competitiveness of national economies.  Be it inadvertently, this 
amounts to playing an active role in social stratification by way of aggregating risks 
and opportunities for specific social groups, rather than distributing risks and 
opportunities evenly among citizens. (In this sense, I prefer to refer to the fourth 
PRGDOLW\RIFDSLWDOLVPDVµDJJUHJDWLYH¶ rather tKDQµUHRUJDQL]HG¶ 
 While in an (idealized) market society risks and opportunities are evenly 
mixed for every participant (thus, in a liberal economy, FDSLWDO¶VRSSRUWXQLW\IRU
wealth-creation is offset by the investment risks it assumes), recently the two have 
become disentangled and even polarized. Indeed, a plethora of recent studies have 
REVHUYHGWKHHPHUJHQFHRIµORVHUV¶DQGµZLQQHUV¶DQHZSUDFDULDW) among advanced 
industrial democracies as a result of globalization.xvi Furthermore, as I have discussed 
in previously published research, as a result of the new distributional functions of the 
state, the polarization of life chances in the new context is no longer determined by 
class position (labor vs. capital), but by institutionalized access to security and 
opportunity (Azmanova 2004), increasingly managed via public intervention of the 
sort discussed above. As a result, a new configuration of winners and losers has 
formed, beyond the traditional divide between capital and labor. 
 This in turn is forging a new ideological divide, cutting across the left-right 
axis of ideological opposition that had been the basis of political competition 
throughout the twentieth century. I have described this new ideological and political 
division as one running between DQµRSSRUWXQLW\¶DQGDµULVN¶SROHRISUHIHUHQFH
DJJUHJDWLRQGHSHQGLQJRQFLWL]HQV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHVRFLDOHIIHFWRIJOREDOL]DWLRQ
(Azmanova 2011). This entails not simply the dissolution of the left-right ideological 
GLYLGHDWHQGHQF\XQGHUµGLVRUJDQL]HG¶FDSLWDOLVPEXWLWVUHFRQILJXUDWLRQLQ
accordance with the novel ethos of post-QHROLEHUDOµDJJUHJDWLYH¶FDSLWDOLVPDQGWKH
novel semantics of state-citizen relations. 
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A pathological legitimacy relationship  
 
The shedding RIWKHVWDWH¶Vresponsibility for social protection, the individual 
responsibilization of citizens for their wellbeing, the privileging of specific economic 
actors for the sake of global competitiveness, and the resulting formation of a new 
precariat of those who are marginalized, all combine to alter the parameters of the 
socio-economic and political order in our societies. This new order is marked by a 
particular state of the legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens ± a 
condition that appears to be pathological from the point of view of standard notions of 
democratic legitimacy.   
 I have proposed to conceptualize the connection between, on the one hand, 
economic interactions and on the other, their political-institutional settings, via the 
notion of a matrix of shared norms shaping the legitimacy relationship between public 
authority and citizens (itself embedded within an ethos, in a Weberian sense). This 
relationship is, in turn, articulated as what citizens perceive to be legitimate and 
legitimacy-conferring functions of the state.  In the course of the institutionalized 
practices of individual responsibilization to which I referred above, the very 
legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens has been altered to 
exclude distributional issues from the range of political responsibility.  This is 
evidenced, for instance, in analyses establishing that globalization weakens the 
FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHQDWLRQDOHFRQRP\DQGFLWL]HQV¶SROLWLFDOFKRLFH± economic 
openness reduces voter tendencies to hold incumbent policy makers responsible for 
economic performance and, by default, for the social consequences of economic 
policies.xvii Such absolution of the state from its social responsibility is asserted even 
via measures explicitly and deliberately intended to enhance social protection. Thus, 
the Council of Europe¶V Charter on Shared Social Responsibilities that was proposed 
for public consultation in the spring of 2011 justifies the novel concept of sharing 
responsibilities among various social actors with the assertion that states are, 
allegedly,  µless able to fulfil their role of ensuring access to social protection¶
(Council of Europe 2011, p. 3). Justifying neo-liberal economic policy with the 
imperatives of globalization, itself presented as a natural phenomenon (rather than 
engineered by specific policies), public authority has thereby effectively managed to 
redefine its relationship with citizens: market-regulative functions linked to the 
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provision of social rights (such as wealth redistribution and guaranteed employment) 
have exited the matrix of this relationship.  
 There is no legitimacy crisis even at the nadir of the economic meltdown in 
advanced liberal democracies because the very legitimacy relationship has been 
altered to exclude issues of VRFLDOVDIHW\IURPWKHUDQJHRISXEOLFDXWKRULW\¶V
responsibility.  Public authority can cause social harm for which it does not assume 
responsibility since the very publics who are suffering the effects of economic policy 
have absolved public authority of the responsibility for the social consequences of 
that policy. This deficiency of responsibility cannot be easily remedied with the tools 
of representative, participatory, or deliberative democracy. To the extent that 
democratic politics is a matter of an institutionally mediated expression of largely 
shared preferences, democratic politics takes place on the terrain of an existing 
legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens. Whatever is not part of 
that relationship cannot be politicized and challenged.  Therefore, if this relationship 
excludes social injustice and thus precludes the formulation of certain social 
grievances addressed to the political authority, the common instruments of democratic 
politics are unlikely to be of much use.  A readjustment of the pathological legitimacy 
relationship between public authority and citizens would require that the state again 
assume responsibility for the social effect of its economic policy.  Failing that, the 
pledges of high-tech, flexible, neoliberal capitalism for a life of autonomy and re-
invention (borrowed unabashedly from the Enlightenment) would but degenerate into 
social exasperation. What we must fear is not the revolt of the masses, but their silent 
escape from freedom. 
     Conclusion  
$GMXVWLQJ3RODQ\L¶VGLDJQRVLVZHPLJKWVD\WKDWWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\FLYLOL]DWLRQKDV
collapsed. I have here attempted to trace one particular trajectory of this collapse: the 
recasting of the legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens, which, 
throughout the past century, had been anchored on a broadly shared notion of social 
MXVWLFHDQGWKHVWDWH¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHVRFLDOFRQVHTXHQFHVRIHFRQRPLFSROLF\,
argued that we are witnessing, since the turn of the new century, a novel modality of 
FDSLWDOLVPZKLFKDOWKRXJKSUHVHUYLQJFDSLWDOLVP¶VRSHUDWLRQDOSULQFLSOHDQGHWKRV
has changed the semantics of state power ± as it has changed the framework within 
which public authority and citizens mutually relate. My sketch here of the emergence 
of post-QHROLEHUDOµDJJUHJDWLYHFDSLWDOLVP¶LVEXWWKHSUROHJRPHQDRIDEURDGHU
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investigation which should account for the formation of new political ideologies and 
public expectations, as well as provide a more elaborate account of the hermeneutics 
of political responsibility in relation to the notion of ethos adumbrated here. Echoing 
the way Weber brought to closure his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, let me end by saying that if this inquiry should serve as a conclusion of an 
investigation, rather than as its preparation, it is bound to accomplish little.  
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 Harvey¶s Marxian critique of contemporary capitalism has gained spectacular popularity; the animated video 
recording of his lecture titled µCrises of Capitalism¶ has been viewed by millions (Harvey, 2010a, 2010b).  
 
ii Elections in 2010 and 2011 brought to power the centre-right in Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Finland, Andorra, 
Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Britain, and the Netherlands ± to consider only the µmature¶ democracies of Europe. In that period the 
majority of the vote went to the centre-left only in Sweden, where the Social Democrats scored only 0,6 percentage points higher 
than the economically liberal Moderate Rally Party (the vote for the former dropped with 4 percentage points since the last 
election, while the vote for the latter rose with 4 percentage points).  
 
iii $VGLVFXVVHGLQWKHµYDULHWLHVRIFDSLWDOLVP¶OLWHUDWXUHJHQHUDWHGE\WKHSLRQHHULQJZRUNRI3HWHU+DOODQG'DYLG
Soskice. The variation typically extends from µliberal market economies¶ (such as the United States and Britain) to µcoordinated 
market economies¶ (such as Japan, Germany and the northern European states), passing through the µmixed¶ type we find in 
southern European countries such as France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. (See Hall and Soskise  2001).  
 iv Max Weber defines ethos in terms of ethical ideals of duty having important formative influences on conduct; in this 
sense he talks about the ethos, or the µeconomic spirit¶, of an economic system (Weber 1992 [1930], p.27). 
v
 This concerns µthe state capacity to manage and distribute societal resources in ways that contribute to the 
achievement of prevailing notions of justice¶Offe1985, p. 5). 
 
vi
 The freedom of contract in time generated the economic constraints to the institutional autonomy of the individual, 
constraints known as labour commodification. 
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 Polanyi goes to great lengths to emphasise that the countermovement against the free market was not driven by 
particular interests or a given ideological agenda: µPrecisely because not the economic but the social interests of different cross 
sections of the population were threatened by the market, persons belonging to various economic strata unconsciously joined 
forces to meet the danger¶ (Polanyi 1957 [1944]: 154-155).  
 
ix
 The first taxonomy captures variation in the degree to which the political economy is coordinated ± as already 
noted, here variation typically extends from µliberal market economies¶ to µcoordinated market economies¶. The second 
taxonomy, introduced by Gosta Esping-Andersen, captures variation in the nature and generosity of social benefits provision. 
Within it, national varieties are clustered into µliberal,¶ µconservative,¶ and µsocial-democratic¶ types of welfare regimes. 
 
x This process is detailed in Boltanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]). 
 
xi
  For a wealth of empirical evidence on this see Rueda (2007). 
 
xii
 Which pledged to make the EU, by 2010, µthe most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world¶ (European Council, 2000). 
 
xiii
 On this see Streeck (1984) and and Rhodes (2001).  
 
xiv
 The standard fictitious commodities, that is, entities which by their very essence 
are not properly susceptible to commodification (production exclusively for market 
exchange), are land, labour and money. To my knowledge, Jean-François Lyotard was the 
first to comment the emerging commodification of knowledge in advanced capitalist societies 
(See J.-F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir, Paris: Minuit, 1979). It is 
also in the nature of risk that it cannot be produced exclusively for market exchange, its 
nature remains strongly relational and thus rooted in the social fabric  
 xv Credit default swaps have existed since the early 1990s, but their use was rapidly 
increased between 2003 and 2007, when the outstanding CDS amount was $62.2 trillion 
(ISDA, 2010).  
xvi
 The groups of winners and losers are often cast in terms of the growing income gap between low-skilled and highly 
skilled workers in industries exposed to globalisation (Geishecker and Gorg 2007, Kapstein 2000). 
xvii
 On this see, for instance, the comprehensive analysis of elections in 75 countries in Hellwig and Samuels (2007). 
